The Foreign Affairs Committee

• He told the FAC that the 45 minutes claim was "existed in the very first draft" of the dossier. (25 June 2003, Q987)

In fact, the claim was, as alleged, not in the original draft of the WMD section of the dossier. Campbell was asked in response to his claim: "Have you gone back to the JIC on that point since publication?" He replied: "I can assure you that I have had many, many discussions about this issue with the Chairman of the JIC, not least in preparation for this hearing."

• He told the FAC that "The Chairman of the JIC wrote the Executive Summary." (Q980) He also claimed: "All I can say to you on that is that the executive summary—and this goes for the entire document—was the product of the pen of the Joint Intelligence Committee chairman." (Q1092)

The Cabinet Office has been unable to state that the executive summary was drafted within that department, let alone by John Scarlett. The claim that every word of the document came from Scarlett’s pen is pure fiction.

• He told the FAC in his supplementary memorandum that when he received John Scarlett’s 10 September draft of the dossier, "To the best of my recollection, and that of Chairman of the JIC, I did not make any comments on the text of the draft at that stage." (Para 8)

The truth was that Campbell had hosted a meeting with Scarlett on the evening of 11 September. Ironically, both told the Hutton Inquiry that it was Campbell, rather than the other spin doctors present, who did all the talking (below).

• In the same memorandum, referring to Scarlett, Campbell stated that "On 17 September, he sent me a further draft."

In fact, in his note to Scarlett of 17 September , to which he was clearly referring when composing the note to the FAC, Campbell referred to another draft he had seen in the meantime: "I felt it worked better in the last draft. Julian showed me." (Para 14)

• In his supplementary memorandum to the FAC, he failed to mention that he had told Scarlett "it would be stronger if we said that despite sanctions and the policy of containment, [Saddam] has made real progress." (Para 1)

• He did not mention that on a number of points, he had referred to the weakness of the current phrasing.

In fact, the points whose weak phrasing Campbell had commented on (Paras 9, 10 & 11) included the 45 minutes claim (Para 10). He failed, of course, to mention at all that he had made any reference to that claim.

• He also said, "I asked if any [uranium] had been secured."

In fact he had asked Scarlett, "Can we say he has secured uranium from Africa." This was a request for a change, with no question mark.

• He wrote: "The JIC chairman circulated a further draft, including to JIC members, on 19 September. He asked for any final comments by 3 pm that day. Neither of us can recall that I made any further points thereafter."

Campbell failed to mention that he made comments both before and after the 3pm deadline. What is significant about this omission is that Campbell made it look as if the JIC had the last word on the dossier, which was untrue.

The Hutton Inquiry

• At the Hutton Inquiry, Campbell was asked about an email dated 9 September 2002 and referring to "a Cab Off meeting at 2pm today w John Williams on the dossier". Asked if he knew whether or not the meeting had gone ahead, he replied, "I do not." (19 August am, Section 17)

This was the first meeting of the dossier drafting group. It is inconceivable that Campbell did not know that such a key meeting had gone ahead, particularly as he had set out in a minute earlier that day how the various elements of the dossier would be drawn together during the afternoon.

• Asked at the Hutton Inquiry whether there was a draft dossier on 9 September, Campbell stated unequivocally, "no, there was not". (19 August 2003 am, Section 25)

Evidence to the Inquiry shows that Campbell was sent John Williams’ 9 September draft (26 August 2003 am, Sections 51-52) and Daniel Pruce’s emailed comments on it.

• Faced with Pruce’s email, Campbell repeatedly told the Inquiry (19 August 2003 am) that Pruce was commenting from outside the process of drafting the dossier. He described the email as "part of the office chatter" (Section 25), one of many from people who were "not terribly closely involved in the process", and famously described Pruce himself as "making contributions effectively above his pay grade" (both Section 36).

In fact, Pruce represented the No 10 press office (23 September 2003 am, Section 83), and therefore Campbell, on the dossier drafting group (23 September 2003 pm, Section 145). Pruce's suggestion that the dossier should include a chapter on the role of intelligence was taken up.

• Asked whether he had arranged the meeting on the evening of 11 September, he replied: "I do not know is the answer to that" and then: "I have no reason to assume that meeting did not go ahead." (22 September 2003 pm, Section 156)

Not only do contemporaneous documents show that Campbell did arrange the meeting, when asked whether the views in critical emails circulated during the day had been put at the meeting, his memory miraculously returned and he insisted that they were not (Section 158-159). This was itself a lie, as John Scarlett admitted that "the main comments made at that meeting I do see reflected now that I see them in some of these e-mails." (26 August am 2003, section 60)